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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 1

APRIL, 1948

NU111BER 3

AN EXAMINATION OF THE TENNESSEE LAW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
GEORGE STREET BOONE

*

INTRODUCTION

For many years in the United States administrative action has been
vigorously criticized and defended, especially in three areas: I in the adjudication of individual cases by administrative agencies; in the consideration of
the scope of judicial review of their actions; and in the delegation and exercise of their rule-making functions. The American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Administrative Law has been active in studying the problems
of administrative law and procedure and, in the federal field, has supported
legislation in Congress. 2 As a result of the efforts of the American Bar Association, of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
and other interested organizations and individuals, Congress, in June, 1946,
adopted a Federal Administrative Procedure Act 3 sponsored by the Ameri4
can Bar Association.
Concurrently, there has been, in many states, an increasing interest in
state administrative activities. Several state legislatures have been sufficiently
concerned over the growth and use of the administrative process to take affirmative action. In 1941 North Dakota adopted an act 5 along the lines of
the Model State Administrative Procedure Act 6, and in the same year Ten*Member of the Bar of Tennessee and of Kentucky.,
1.
2.
and S.
3.

REP. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. AD. PRoc., 1-2 (1941).
Hearings before Subcommittee of the Cznuuittee of the Judiciary o tS. 674, S. 675,
918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1578 (1941).60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1946).

4. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS SPECrAL

REPORT, MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1946).
5. N. D. Laws 1941, c. .240.
6. The history of the current Model State Administrative Procedure Act is found in
Dean Stason's special report made in October, 1946, to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The original proposal for a state administrative
procedure act was made in the judicial administration section of the American Bar Association. The Bar Association on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals, created in 1937,
presented a comprehensjve report on judicial review of state administrative action in state
courts at the American Bar Association meeting in 1938. The same section, in 1939,
offered a draft of a proposed act dealing with certain major phases of state administrative
procedure, and this act, designed to serve as a model for state legislation, was referred by
the section of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. After
consideration and consultation with the American Bar Association Committee on Judicial
Administration, a revised draft was presented at the 1940 session of the National Conference. After adopting this draft, the-Conference referred it to the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association for approval, but no action was taken by that body. Subsequently, following the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
1
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nessee adopted a statute 7 requiring approval of administrative regulations by
the Attorney General and filing in the office of the Secretary of State. Prior
to this legislation, in Tennessee, a form of statutory certiorari for the review
of acts of boards and commissions had been adopted as a part of the 1932
Tennessee Code.8 Wisconsin adopted an early version of the Model Act in
1943,9 and in the same year North Carolina adopted a Revocation of Licenses
Act.10 In 1942, Ohio adopted a Uniform Administrative Procedure Act 11 applicable to licensing functions. In 1944 Virginia adopted an Administrative
Agencies Act ' 2 which was amended two years later.13 In 1945 Illinois adopted
an Administrative Review Act 14 and Pennsylvania enacted an Administrative
Agency Law.' 5 The same year, following a careful study by its Judicial
Council,' 6 California passed three separate acts: the Administrative Procedure Act,' 7 the Division of Administrative Procedure Act,' 8 and the Judicial
Review Procedure Act.' 9 At the Iowa State Bar Association meeting in the
summer of 1947 an analysis of administrative agency investigations was distributed.2 0
In Tennessee, as in other jurisdictions, the considerably expanded scope
of government regulation has resulted in an increase of power in the hands
of administrative officers and agencies. In the state there are, for example,
eighteen departments and at least twenty-nine commissions, most of which
have been granted the-power to make rules. 2 ' Nor are these the only authorities
Procedure (1941) and the Benjamin Report on Administrative Adjudication in New York
(1942), a completely revised draft was submitted for consideration at the 1942 session of
the Conference and, after consideration, that draft was recommitted for further study but
was enacted almost verbatim in Wisconsin. See note 9 infra. A proposed Uniform Act was
submitted to the Conference at the annual session held in Chicago in 1943, but at this
session it was decided to offer instead of a Uniform Act, a Model Act because the subject
was one in which uniformity among the states was not necessary although it was felt
that a tendency toward uniformity would be helpful. The Model Administrative Procedure Act was adopted by the qommissioners in 1944, but the promulgation was made
subject to approval by the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association because
that organization was sponsoring before Congress the so-called Federal Administrative
Procedure Act which paralled in most respects the minority report of the Attorney
General's Committee, and it was desired to avoid interfering with the consideration of that
measure. The Board of Governors has not yet given its approval to the Model Act
despite the adoption of the federal act in June, 1946.
7. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1941, c. 111.
8. TENN. CODE §§ 9008-9018 (Williams, 1934).
9. Wis. Laws 1943, c. 375.

10. N. C.

GEN. STAT.

150-1 to 150-8 (1943).

Oaio GEN. CODE, §§ 154-56 to 154-74 (Page, 1946).
Va. Acts 1944, c. 160.
Va. Acts 1946, c. 234.
Laws 1945, p. 1144.
Ill.
Penn. Acts 1945, no. 442.
16. 10th JUD. CoUNcIL CAL. BIENN. REP. (1944).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

17.

CAL. STATS.

(1945), c. 867.

18. Id, c. 869.
19. Id., c. 868.

20.

ADmuilSTRATIvE AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

1947 (Iowa).

21. These include the Departments of Accounts, Budget, Personnel, Purchasing, Local
Finance, Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, Conservation, Education, Employment Security,
Finance and Taxation, Highways and Public Works, Institutions, Insurance and Banking,
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with such powers. Generally, it is held by the more than twenty examining
and licensing boards which were formerly under the Department of Educa22

tion.

Although there is, in Tennessee, no well-developed body of decisions
dealing with the problems of administrative procedure, there are decisions
concerning notice and hearing, administrative rule-making, the validity of
rules, and judicial review of such actions. The aim herein is to collect these
cases and consider the judicial principles which are being evolved, together
with a consideration of certain representative local statutes. An attempt Will
be made in the discussion of certain agencies, to show problems which have
arisen in administration and, to a limited degree, the attitude of the courts
toward the administrative process in the state. The method of study combines the use of written materials, including statutes, reports, rules and regulations, the observation of a limited number of public hearings, interviews
and correspondence with officials. So far as it is possible, the examination is
restricted to procedural aspects of the administrative agencies and no attempt
is made to illustrate the substantive rules.
RULE-MAKING

As noted, in 1941 the Tennessee legislature passed a statute governing
the adoption of rules and regulations by state officers and agencies. 23 This
legislation however, imposed no obligation to adopt rules or regulations and
will be considered in more detail later. In addition to this general legislation,
an examination of the statutes under which function various administrative
officers and agencies discloses that delegation of rule-making power is a
very popular device in the state-popular, at least with the legislature.
The Department of Finance and Taxation, for example, has been exLabor, Public Health, Public Welfare, and Safety; the Commissions of Aeronautics,
Armories, Athletic, Building, Charitable and Penal Institutions, Civil Service, Code;
Conservation, Constitutional Revision, Crippled .Children's, Forrest Park Memorial,
Historical, Housing Handicapped Children, Inter-governmental Co-operation, Interstate
on Crime, John Sevier Memorial, Law Library, Reelfoot Lake, State Planning, Surplus
Property, Tuberculosis Hospital; State -Retirement Board, Hospital Board, Unclaimed
Bodies Board, Standardization, State Consolidation, Tennessee Nutrition, To Investigate
Charitable and Penal Institutions.
22. The boards are: Examiners in the Basic Sciences, Healing Arts, Registration in
Chiropody, Optometry, Osteopathic Registration, Licensing General Contractors, Stallion
Enrollment, Anatomy, Plumbers, Comamittee on Nursing Education and Practice, Examiners for Nurses, Accountancy, Cosmetology, Architects and Engineers, Dental
Examiners, Law Examiners, Barbers, Medical Examiners, Chiropractic Examiners, Pharmacy, Veterinary Medical Examiners, Advisory Committee of Librarians. Formerly the
records of these boards were maintained by the Division of Professional Registration in
the Department of Education under Tennessee Code (Williams, 1934) Secs. 6902 et seq.
Section 2 of Chapter 211, Pub. Acts 1937, an appropriations bill, directed 90% of the fees
collected by each board be paid to the boards and the balance to the general fund of the
state. On the authority of this, the Division of Certification and Professional Registration
ceased to function, and was instructed to return all business held to the secretary-treasurer
of each board.
23. TENN. CODE §§ 1034.19-25 (Williams, 1934).
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pressly authorized to make rules and regulations to carry into effect: the income tax;24 the regulation of the sale of gas ;25 the registration of motor vehicles;26 the administration of the alcohol beverage tax;27 enforcement of
the inheritance tax;28 effectuation of the estate tax, 29 the excise tax,30 the
gift tax,31 and the sales tax;32 with the assistance of the State Board of
Equalization, the rules for the conduct of that body ;33 the administration of
the department of county tax assessors and county boards of equalization ;34
the act governing outdoor advertising;30 the traffic in alcoholic beverages ;36
the act governing transfer of title to motor vehicles ;87 the inspection by tate
oil inspector;38 the enforcement of limitation on importation of gasoline ;39
the government of the State Highway Department ;40 the enforcement of the
41
Beer Tax statute.
The State Department of Agriculture or administrative officers in that
department have been granted the authority to make rules and regulations:
for inspection, analysis, and tests of commercial fertilizers ;42 to control
insecfs, fungi and similar pests;43 to effectuate quarantines;44 to establish
standards for commercial feed stuff;45 to administer the Dairy and Dairy
Production Act; 46 to carry on business of the State Planning Commission; 47
to administer the Agriculture Conservation Act ;48 concerning the conserva'tion of lands ;49 for control of weights and measures ;50 to control licenses for
hatching and sale of baby chicks;51 for the suppression of communicable
diseases in cattle ;52 to control the sale of oleomargarine ;53 to enforce the act
24. Id. § 1123.31.
25. Id. § 1147.9
26. Id. § 1152.3.
27. Id. § 1191.8.
28. Id. § 1273.
29. Id. § 1308.
30. Id. § 1323. This section provides that rules will be effective when published.
31. Id. § 1328.10.
32. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 3, § 13.
33. TN. CODE § 1449 (Williams, 1934).
34. Id. § 1478.
35. Id. § 5753.12.
36. Id. § 6648.7 (Supp. 1947).
37. Id. § 6770.23.
38. Id. § 6850.2.
39. Id. § 11392.3 (Supp. 1947).
40. Id. § 11464.
41. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 109, § 1.
42. TENN. CODE §§ 429, 514 (Williams, 1934).
43. Id. § 446.
44. Id. § 452.
45. Id. § 499.
46. Id. § 535.
47. Id. § 552.8.
48. Id. § 552.30.
49. Id. § 552.39.
50. Id. §' 595, 6652.
51. Id. § 525.4 (Supp. 1947).
52. Id. § 5027.
53. Id. § 6546.15.
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governing marketing and sale of strawberries ;54 for the analysis and inspection of insecticides and fungicides ;55 to establish quality of food ;56 to control
adulteration; 57 to enforce the Adulterated or Mishandled Foods Act; 58 for

licensing pest eradicators ;59 for governing construction and operation of locker
61
plants ;60 for licensing persons engaged in slaughtering livestock.
The Railroad and Public Utilities Commission can prescribe rules or regulations: for the construction and maintenance of wires across railroad
tracks ;62 to govern hearings, to determine complaints,6 3 and to subpoena witnesses ;64 to fix reasonable standards for public utility services and practices,
their standards of *measurement, and to secure accuracy of their measuring
devices ;65 pertaining to motor carrier rates, fares and charges ;66 to fix rates,
67
charge , tariffs, or prevent discrimination by railroads.
In the state the numerous statutory grants of rule-making power vary
widely. A few have required notice and hearing as a condition precedent to
rulemaking. 68 In one enactment, the Commissioner of Agriculture is authorized
to make regulations for enforcement of the Adulterated or Misbranded Foods
act, but before promulgation of any regulations, thirty days notice, specifying
the time and place of hearing, must be given. 69 In connection with the regulatioft of public utilities, the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission has' the
power, after hearing, to fix just and reasonable standards of service and practice, to fix standards for measurements, and to enact rules to ensure accuracy
of all meters and appliances for measurement. 0 This Commission has the
power, also after hearing all interested persons, to prescribe regulations for
construction and maintenance of .wires across the tracks of a railroad.7 1 The
State Oil and Gas Board can make no rule or order except after a public hearing upon at least ten days notice. 72 Another variant is the authorization to the
Commissioner of Public Welfare to hold hearings relating to fact determinations which he is required or authorized to make. 73 The latest instance is the
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 6579.18.
Id. § 6807.
Id. § 6580.21 (Supp. 1947).
Id. § 6580.14 (Supp. 1947).

58. Id. § 6580.21 (Supp. 1947).

59. Tenn. Pub. Acts 19471 c 19, § 5.

60. Id. c. 143, § 10.
61. Id. c. 226, § 3.
62. TENN. CODE § 2668 (Williams, 1934).

§2.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 5399.
Id, § 5405.
Id. § 5450.
Id. § 5501.4.
Id. § 5397.
This requirement is included in the Model State Administrative Procedure Act,

69.

TEN ,q. CODE

§ 6580.21 (Williams, 1934).

70. Id. §§ 54 50(e), (f), (g).

71. Id. § 2668.

72. Id. § 5240.6.
73. Id. § 4765.J2.
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prescription that "general and special rules may be adopted, amended or rescinded by the Commissioner [of Employment Security] only after public
hearing or opportunity to be heard thereon, of which proper notice has been
given." 74
The statutory procedures to be followed by rule-making authorities vary
widely with the requirements of the particular circumstances. It is apparent
that there can be no single uniform "quasi"-legislative procedure which will be
appropriate for the formulation, in every circumstance, of all types of regulation. Among the more useful procedural methods for such action may be included: informal investigation and study by the agency; consultation by the
agency with those who will be affected by the regulation; utilization of advisory
committees; employment of other outside sources of information and advice;
and private or public hearings.
These methods are adaptable to various uses. Consultation, for example,
may be by informal conference or by correspondence, or may be with temporary
or permanently organized advisory committees or by hearings. Such hearings,
too, differ widely in nature and scope.
In rule-making procedures the leading characteristic is the exercise of discretion by the authorities entrusted with the task. Ordinarily the chief issues
are not factual ones but involve such matters as the formulation of new policies.
Despite these considerations the Model State Administrative Procedure Act
provides that prior to the adoption of any rule, the adopting agency shall
hold hearings. 75 Similarly, in the federal field, rule-making powers can be exer76
cised, with limited exceptions, only after notice and hearing.
(1) Delegation of Power
The granting of power to make rules springs from the limitations of the
legislature. Modem legislation with increasing frequency seeks to deal with
regulatory problems by setting forth less frequently in the legislation itself
the particular rules that shall control, but by granting to an administrator the
power to prescribe governing regulations in certain spheres of activity. Although the doctrine of separation of powers is established by the state constitution 77 this has not prevented the growth of the administrative process.
While delegation has proved conducive to flexibility, it may also be subject to abuse 78 and, in their desire to prevent abuses, the courts of Tennessee
have sought to control the rule-making power. They have spoken generally in
terms of "delegation of power."
74. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 29, § 11 (B).
75. Model State Administrative Procedure Act, § 2(3).
76. 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1003 (Supp. 1946).
77. TENN. CONST. Art. II, §§ 1-2; Art. VI, § 1.

78. Statement by Dean Pound, Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee of
the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st 'Sess. (1941) 1579-1584.
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"Delegation of law-making power," says a recent writer, "is the dynamo
of modern government....

Today, while theory still affirms legislative su-

premacy, we see power flowing back increasingly to the executive, to referred
rather than original power. Departure from the traditional rationalizations of
the status quo arouses distrust. Delegation as the hand maiden of regulation is
distasteful to holders of economic power, but there is also general concern
that large decisions of policy should be grounded in consent. Consent is the
product of compromise and can only be arrived at through representation.
The legislature comprises a broader cross section of interests than any one administrative organ; it is less likely to be 'captured' by particular interests." 79
The Supreme Court of, Tennessee has adopted the rule stated in Corpus
Juris8 0 as an apt statement of the rule regarding delegation of power: "While
.

.

. the legislature may not delegate the exercise of its discretion as to what

the law shall be, it may confer discretion in the administration of the law ...
The difficulty lies, not in determining the governing principle, but in the application to concrete cases. With the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the
Courts." 81 The Court continues: "[W] hile the legislature cannot delegate
the power to make a law, it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its
own action depend." 82 It has repeated with approval the distinction of Judge
Ranney, which Mr. Justice Harlan quoted in Field v. Clark, 83 that "the true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, andconferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." 84
But if the standard is a riddle, as Mr. Justice Cardozo said,8 5 it is no
answer to say that the "nature of the final act" determines the nature of the
power which was alleged to have been delegated,8 6 although the supreme court
79. Jaffee, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Powers: I, 47 COL. L. Rxv.
359 (1947).
80. 12 C. J. 840-841.
81. Quoted in.: Richardson v. Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, 667, 57 S.W.2d 797, 799 (1933);
Llewellyn v. Knox County, 165 Tenn. '319, 331, 54 S.W.2d 973, 976 (1932).
82. Richardson v. Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, 667, 57 S.W.2d 797, 799 (1933) ; cf. Holliston
Mills v. McGuffin, 177 Tenn. 1, 146 S.W.2d 134 (1940); Carothers v. Giles County, 162

Tenn. 492, 39 S.V.2d 584 (1931).
83. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).

84. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Co. v. Comm'rs., 1 Ohio St. 88, quoted in Holliston

Mills v. McGuffin, 177 Tenn. 1, 14, 145 S.W. 2d 1, 6 (1940).

85. "The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of'law; it is rather a way of life.
Life in all its fulness must supply the answer to the riddle." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111, 115 (1933).
86. Hughes, C. J., in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (1913).
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has cited this as a guide.8 7 The question remains of determining the nature of
the final act.
The approach to the problem of delegation on thie basis of ideal conceptions of judicial, executive, and legislative powers has led largely to semantic
confusion and proved of little assistance in concrete cases. The fact-determination test, or what may be more aptly called a "contirqgency" test, well demonstrates that this conceptualistic approach is unrewarding.
The inadequacy of his "contingency" test is best shown by an illustration.
Suppose a statute provides that if the Commissioner of Agriculture believes
that the prohibition of growing Indian hemp may in the future be necessary to
protect the health and welfare of the public, he may prohibit the cultivation of
the plant except under such limitations or exceptions as he may prescribe. Disobedience will be punishable by fine. This clearly may be challenged as a delegation of legislative power because there is more than a fact determination;
there is a prediction of future events and a determination of what the law
shall be.
But suppose the act had been drafted differently. Suppose the provision
had read that if the Commissioner, after hearing, determines that in the past
the cultivation of Indian hemp has resulted in the injury to or impairment of
the health of the citizens of the state, then cultivating the plant will be a criminal offense except in accordance with the rules and regulations made by the
Commissioner to protect the health of the citizenry. There is no legislation
here by the contingency test; there is merely a determination of fact. But it
would take an exceedingly subtle mind to distinguish between the results
reached in the same situation. Is the first case one of prediction of future
eVents, the latter merely a factual determination? What is fact? Is there a
manner of judging the fact except on the basis of past experience?
(2) Validity of Rules
But deficiencies in one test do not mean that there is no strength in the
fundamental position or that the results reached in particular instances by the
-courts may not be workable. Although the general discussion of concepts discloses less of the substance of the theory of separation of powers than the enduring vitality of the doctrine indicates exists in practice, perhaps the conception of the courts in Tennessee will appear from what they have done in
particular situations.
In the performance of his duties, the Commissioner of Finance and
Taxation in Tennessee has issued many regulations, and his regulations governing the sale and transportation of liquor have been more frequently challenged in the appellate courts than any rules issued in the state. In a recent
87. In re Cumberland Power Co., 147 Tenn. 504, 511-512, 249 S.W. 818, 820 (1923).
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case, the Commissioner, in accordance with the rule he had adopted, refused to
grant a liquor dealer license to a petitioner whose brother-in-law's license had
been revoked. The petitioner, after complying with all the statutory prerequisites to obtaining a license, sought by mandamus to compel the issuance on
the ground that the rule was too unreasonable to be sustained. After hearing
testimony of the Commissioner concerning past.experience with issuance to
relatives of violators, the lower court refused to issue the writ. This decision
was affirmed on appeal.88
The following year the supreme court sustained a rule concerning the
confiscation of vehicles used for the illegal transportation of liquor. The truck
in question was hired by persons who used it for such purposes, but the owner
claimed he was unaware of the reason for hiring. The rule placing the burden
of knowledge on the owner was challenged as unreasonable but was sustained.89
The next court challenge to a rule of the Commissioner arose over the
suspension of a dealer's license for -violation of a rule prohibiting the addition of brands of liquor to a dealer's stock without written approval by the
Commissioner. The court, on a petition for certiorari from a hearing.before,
the. Commissioner, said the regulation was invalid because it tended to create
a monopoly in violation of local laws and statutes. Reversing on appeal, the
supreme court found no evidence of the use to create a monopoly and said
that it refused to interfere lightly with the discretion of the Commissioner:
"since the power of the state to prohibit sales altogether is beyond question,
no provision for its regulation is beyond state power." 90
Nevertheless this dictum was speedily distinguished when the Commissioner sought to enforce a regulation prohibiting the operation of a retail
liquor establishment within one hundred feet of public places in vhich liquor
is consumed. This regulation was issued in September, 1945, and a dealer
sought to enjoin interference with his operation under an annual license issued
before the promulgation of the fegulation. The court called the application of
the regulation to this dealer "retroactive and oppressive" and said a license
once granted for a fixed period should not be, in effect, withdrawn, cancelled
or suspended without fault or failure on part of the holder. 91
88. McCanless v. Hamm, 181 Tenn. 308, 181 S.W.2d 154 (1944).
89. McQueen v. McCanless, 182 Tenn. 453, 187 S.W.2d 630 (1945).
90. McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 639, 188 S.W.2d 745, 748 (1945).
91. Wise v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 107, 191 S.W.2d 169 (1945). The court said the
test was whether the regulations were unreasonable or oppressive and cited as its precedents the following cases which involved municipal ordinances: Newbern v. McCann,
105 Tenn. 159, 58 S.W. 114 (1900) ; Grills v. Jonesboro, 87 Tenn. 247 (1874) ; Maxwell
"r.
Jonesboro, 58 Tenn. 257 (1872). It is interesting to note that the court in the principal
case says that the regulation is valid except in its application to dealers already licensed.
The balance of public good against private rights is changed by the payment of a license
fee. But see Grubb v. Morristown, 203 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tenn.; 1947) where a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer was adQpted .while, licenses permitting the sale- of
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The next year in Brown v. McCanle~s the supreme court sustained
the action of the Commissioner in refusing to issue a liquor dealer license because, under one of his regulations, the premises on which the applicant proposed to do business were too near a school.
Suppose, instead, the school had been built adjoining a liquor dispensary. Could the latter have continued operation until his annual license had
expired?
The Commissioner has been less successful in the field of taxation. The
Commissioner's rule interpreting a statutory provision concerning the loss
of gallonage of gasoline in shipment was overruled because the court felt
that it was not a correct interpretation of "legislative intent." 93 In another
situation, however, the supreme court sustained an exercise of the power to
define "net earnings" for a taxing statute, since granting this authority was
94
I
not a delegation of legislative power.
The Railroad and Public Utilities Commission has experienced more
difficulty with its regulations before the courts. While there has been judicial
approval of rules of the Commission regarding crossing signs, 95 in more important matters it has not fared so well. In 1928, the Commission's rules required applicants who sought certificates of public convenience and necessity
for hydro-electric developments to agree, in advance of hearing, to a fixing
of a basis for future determinations of value, rates, and other valuable
rights; to the payment of certain fixed charges; and to a right of recapture
by the state after a stipulated period. The requirements were challenged by
a declaratory judgment, and it was held that the Commission could not impose conditions such as these in advance of hearing although, by statute, the
Commission had the power to impose such conditions as the public interest
might require.9 6 Only a year later the supreme court, again in a proceeding for
a declaratory judgment, held invalid a rule of the Commission relating to the
maintenance of railroad depots. It field that the Commission, in adopting a
rule which would affect the terms of employment or hours of duty at depots,
was acting udtra vires. Although the duty was imposed on the Commission
"to require the location of such'depots and . . . passenger buildings as the
...public comfort may require," a rule prescribing "no such depot... now
established or which may hereafter be established pursuant to orders made
beer issued by the city beer board still had some time to run. The court upheld 'the ordi-

nance, saying the license was "merely a temporary permit to do what was otherwise
unlawful," and it gave no property right entitling the holders to notice and hearing before
revocation. Wise v. McCanless was not cited.
92. 195 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn., 1946).
93. TENN. CODE § 1130 (Williams, 1934); State v. Texas Co., 173 Tenn. 154, 116
S.W.2d 583 (1938).
94. Bank of Commerce v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 250 S.W. 144 (1924).
95. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 154 Tenn. 208, 285 S.W. 582 (1926).
96. Tenn. Eastern Elec. Co. v. Hannah, 157 Tenn. 582, 12 S.W.2d 372 (1928).
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by the Commission or voluntarily by such company, or otherwise established,
shall be closed, removed, suspended, discontinued or abolished without authority granted by the Commission upon written application," was held to be an
interference with the control of employees by the railroad and so beyond the
97
power of the Commission.
Similarly, the State Board of Barber Examiners has not been handled
gently by the courts. Under a statute which gave the Board the power to approve the minimum prices when a schedule was submitted by seventy-five
percent of the barbers, that body ratified a schedule of fees. These standards
were designed to protect the public health, but the court viewed this action
very dimly. It held that such action invaded the right of personal liberty, the
right of propbrty, and the right to make contracts for the sale of labor.98 The
court quoted with approval the dissenting opinion in a Louisiana case 9 9 to
the effect that the only appropriate way to protect public health or promote public welfare in barber shops was to establish sanitary regulations and requirements, to maintain cleanliness in the barber shops, to guard against unhealthy
barbers, and similar provisions. This dissenting judge said he could see no way
in which fixing minimum prices could protect, or have a tendency to protect,
public health. The Tennessee court saw in the statute an imminent threat to
the liberty of the individual and the right to contract. It also held invalid a
regulation governing opening and closing hours on the ground that such power
was not granted to the Board. It said by way of dictum that had this latter
power been expressly conferred, it would have been "an unreasonable and unnecessary exercise of the police power." 100
But if the court thinks that the Board of Barber Examiners cannot be
granted the power to approve prices to protect the public health, when the
need becomes more immediately urgent, as in the case of a communicable
disease, different results are reached. In a habeas corpus proceeding a rule of
the State Board of Health was challenged. The rule prescribed that every
person infected with a communicable disease should strictly observe quarantine regulations. The statutory authorization to make rules prescribed that
violations of rules made thereunder should be misdemeanors. The court sustained imprisonment of the petitioner for violation of the quarantine rule
when she was unable to pay her fine. 01'
The Commissioner of Agriculture's rules of quarantine have also been
sustained. A cattle owner was fined for violation of a quarantine rule im97. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1907, c. 390, § 2; INashville, C. & St. L. -Ry. v. Railroad Comm.,
159 Tenn. 43, 15 S.W.2d 751 (1925). Compare Cincinnati, N, 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. State,
148 Tenn. 128, 252 S.W. 1000 (1923).
98. Board of Barber Examiners v. Melton, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253 (1939).
99. Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 298, 182 So. 484, 512 (1938).
.100. Board of Barber Examiners v. Melton, 174 Tenn. 178, 192, 134 S.W.2d 253, 258

(1939).

101. State ex tel. Kennedy v. Head, 182 Tenn. 249, 185 S.W.2d 530 (1945).
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posed upon cattle.' On appeal the conviction was upheld; and the court, considering the challenge to the rule, said: "The question of reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the rule or regulation of the Agriculture Department involved in this case was one for the court, and not for the jury to determine.
The general rule is that the reasonableness of rules, regulations, or by-laws
adopted and promulgated by officials and boards pursuant to authority delegated by the legislature is to be decided as a question of law, and that such bylaw, rule or regulation, if unreasonable, is to be held void as a matter of
law ... " 103

(3)

Extent of Present Utilization of Rule-Making Power

These challenges to substantive rules amply demonstrate that regulation
by administrative rule has been appreciable in Tennessee. Many of the rulemaking powers have been exercised to formulate substantive regulations, but
comparatively few authorities have used their powers to prescribe rules of
procedure and practice, generally contenting themselves with the issuance of
these substantive rules or regulations. Among the notable exceptions are the
and the
Board of Claims, 10 4 the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission,'
Board of Review of the Division of Unemployment Compensation.0 6 These
agencies have published detailed procedural rules in printed form. None of
the" licensing boards has adopted such rules, nor has the Commissioner of
Finance-and Taxation, 10 7 nor has the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking.'0 8 The Department of Public Welfare has issued a Welfare Manual 1o
which, in one section, describes the procedures in complaints and hearings 110
under the public assistance statutes, but this latter is descriptive in form, setting out the aim of a fair hearing and the rights of applicants and recipients
under the statutes. The manual, in loose-leaf format, is designed for the use of
the staff in administration 111 and is supplemented at intervals by numbered
bulletins disseminated to all regional and county offices. These bulletins serve
to maintain the manual in a current condition.
102. Bishop v. State, 122 Tenn. 729, 127 S.W. 598 (1908):
103. Id. at 738-739.
104. RULES OF BOARD OF CLAIMS (Tenn. 1945).
105. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE BEFORE THE RAILROAD

AND PUBuc UTILITIES

CommISSION (Tenn. 1942).
106. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF BOARD OF REVIEW UF THE DIVISION OF UNEAIPLOYMENT COMMISSION (Tenn. 1942).
107. Letter of Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, dated July 2, 1947.
108. Letter of Deputy Commissioner of Insurance and Banking, dated July 8. 1947.
109. TENNESSEE PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL (1946).

110. Id. Vol. II, c. 2, § 8, pp. 2264-2267.
111. Id. Vol. II, Foreword.
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(4) Filing of Riles and Regulations with Secretary of State
One of the grave sources of dissatisfaction with the administrative process generally has been the unavailability of rules and regulations issued by
the agencies and -commissions. Tennessee has sought to cope with this problem by a statute which requires that when any "state executive officer, board,
department, bureau, authority [or] commission" promulgates a rule except
"such as relate to the organization or internal management of such agency,".
then that rule must be printed and filed in the office of the Secretary of State 112
where it becomes a public record." 3 This section required the filing of all
rules and regulations effective at the time of the adoption of the act in 1941.
The statute, Chapter 111 of the Acts of 1941, imposes the additional requirement that the regulations be approved by the Attorney General11 4 and
printed and filed in a manner to, be prescribed by a board composed of the
Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Commissioner of Finance and
Taxation." 6 A 'regulation is not effective until filed "6 and it is expressly
stipulated in a separate section of the act that all rules and regulations published after the effective date "will be void .

.

. until the aforesaid require-

ments are compiled with." 117
The aim of this statute is to make available to the public the rules which
are binding, on individuals. Basic principles of fairness require that, before
individuals are required to comply with administrative rules, notice and opportunity to become familiar with their contents should be provided. 118 The
statute seems to provide protection to the individual, but lack of compliance
with the duties imposed by the enactment indicates some indifference.
Chapter 111 was drafted by the 9ffice of the Attorney General with the
cooperation of the Commissiofier of Finance and Taxation in 1941. The
measure was sponsored by the state administration.
The board upon which was 'imposed the duty of establishing the form in
which the rules and regulations should be published and filed has never met.119
The rules on file in the office of the Secretary of State are collected in a
manila folder and vary in form from printed, permanently-bound rules
through multigraphed ones to unbound carbon copies. Only nine agencies have
112. TENN. CODE § 1034.19 (Williams, 1934).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. § 1034.22.
Id. § 1034.21.
Id. § 1034.20.
Id. § 1034.21.
Id. § 1034.23.

118. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act in Section 3 and the 1943
Uniform Act, also in Section 3, require administrative rules be filed with the Secretary of
State. Section 1003 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act has a provision with
similar aims, requiring adoption and publication in the Federal Register of substantive
rules, statements of policy and procedures.
119. Former Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, -letter dated June 21, i947.
(This fact was confirmed in the office of the Secretary of State.)
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filed rules, virtually all of which have been approved by the Attorney General.
The rules on file relate, in general, to substantive matters. The Commissioner
of Finance and Taxation has filed substantially more than any other agency.
Approximately fifty different rules or sets of rules are now on deposit in the
file in the office of the Secretary. These vary from single regulations to complete booklets, such as the Rules and Regulations 120 for the administration of
-Finance and Taxation.
The statute imposes no obligation to adopt rules but 6nly the filing of
those adopted. It has not been cited in any reported case, but similar provisions have been incorporated in individual statutes both before and since
the adoption of the act. The requirements of filing with the Secretary of
State 12 2 and that of approval by the Attorney General 123 are found in such
statutes.
(5) Publication of Rules
In addition to the requirement of filing of rules with a state official some
states require that rules and regulations be published. 124 In Oregon all rules
and regulations must be filed with the Secretary of State who is required to
publish summaries 125 while in Kansas all rules and regulations of a general
nature must be deposited with the revisor of statutes. 126 In Wisconsin the
12 7
revisor of statutes is required to assemble and publish them annually.
Massachusetts requires that all such materials be included in the annual reports required of the state officers.128 California's Codification Board publishes all such material deposited with the Secretary of State in the California
12 9
Administrative Register. '
In Tennessee the rules must be collected and printed by the promulgating
body 130 and copies filed with the Secretary of State in a form to be prescribed. 131 When filed the rules become public records and are available for
inspectiori.1 32 Copies of the rules are to be distributed on request to various
120. TENNESSEE RETAILERS' SALES TAX ACT RULES AND REGULATIONS

(Tenn. 1947).

the Tennessee Retailers' Sales Tax Act 121 issued by the Department of
121. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 3.
122. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1937, c. 305, § 19, Rules of Aeronautic Bureau; Tenn.
Pub. Act 1947, c. 29, § 11(B), Rules of Dept. of Employment Security; Tenn.
Pub. Acts 1935, c. 157, § 1(d), Rules of Dept. of Insurance and Banking.
123. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1939, c. 128, § 1, Regulations by Commissioner of Agriculture; Tenn. Pub. Acts, 1947, c. 29, § 11 (B), Rules of Dept. of Employment Security.
124. The Model Act provides, in Section 4, for compilation, indexing and periodical
publication of rules and regulations under the supervision of the Secretary of State.
125. Ore. Laws 1939, c. 474.
126. Kan. Laws 1939, c. 308.
127. Wis. Pub. Acts 1939, c. 428.
128. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1939, c. 499.
129. Calif. Laws 1941, c. 628.
130. TENN. CODE § 1034.19 (Williams, 1934).
131. Id. §§ 1034.19-20. See § 3 of the Model Act.
132. Id. § 1034.21.
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promulgating authorities 13 but there is no provision for their periodic publication. The duty of collecting and filing is a duty imposed, not on the Secretary of State, but on the various rule-making authorities. The duties of the
Secretary of State seem to have been fulfilled in this respect when he maintains a file of the rules 134 and furnishes copies to the office of the Attorney
13 5
General.
Certain statutes in Tennessee have, for a considerable time, imposed the
duty of publishing rules and regulations, such as those regarding excise
taxes 136 or for the enforcement and administration of the Employment Security Act. 3 7 The latter, a recent statute, requires publication in a newspaper
of general circulation. 138 In the case of regulation of fish and game rights on
private lands, the Department of Conservation must post rules and regula140
tions 139 and must publish proclamations of open seasons in newspapers.
The Department of Institutions must publish its regulations concerning the
management and supervision of state hospitals in the biennial report of the
141
Commissioner.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND ADmINISTRATIVE RULEs

(1) The Petition for Adoption of Rules
There seems little doubt that the Constitutional guarantee of free speech
insures the right of petition for the adoption of rules-a right in the sense
that anyone can, at any time, request an agency to exercise its rule-making
power. Many lawyers think that a formal statement of that right is desirable
in order to acquaint individuals with it, and to apprise the agencies of their
142
duty to receive and consider such requests.
The right to petition has been granted by statute in at least one instance
in Tennessee though there is no court report of the section having ever been
invoked. Under the Department of Agriculture the supervisors of soil conservation districts may make rules governing the use of lands in the interest
of conserving soil. The owner of the land affected is given the right to ask
for amendment, supplement or repeal.

43

133. Ibid.
134. TENN. CODE § 1034.21 (Williams, 1934).
135. Id. § 1034.22.
136. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1937, c. 99, § 3.
137. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 29, § ll(B).
138. Ibid.
139. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1941, c. 103, § 3'
140. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 59, § 2.'
141. TENN. CODE § 4499 (Williams, 1934). See note 128, supra.
142. Both the Model Act in Section 5 and the 1943 Uniform Act in Section 7
grant the right to petition. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act grants the right
to petition. 60 STAT. 245, (1946) 5 U.S.C.A. sec. 1009(a) (Supp. 1946).

143.

TENN. CODE

§ 532.39 (Williams, 1934).
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(2)

Test of Validity of Rules, by Declaratory Judgment

A far more important right than that to petition for rules is the right
to test the validity of an adminisrative rule in a judicial proceeding for a
declaratory judgment. Criticism has been directed at the necessity of disobeying an administrative regulation in order to test its validity.144 Dean Pound
says: "Rules of ... doubtful validity ought not to ...await determination
in litigation after action contravening them. Parties should not be required
to run the risk of infringing rules having the force of law in order to find out
what their rights are under the law. Every reason for the practice of declaratory judgments, now so generally adopted everywhere, applies to ascertainment of the validity of administrative rules in advance of infringement of
them." 145
Professor Borchard of Yale thinks this is an area especially suitable for
the use of declaratory judgments. He says: "Possibly in no branch of litigation is the declaration more useful than in the relation between the citizens
and the administration. With the growing complexity of government and
the constantly increasing invasions of private liberty, with ever widening
powers vested in administrative boards and officials, the occasion for conflict and dispute are rapidly augmenting in frequency and importance. Yet
the very fact that such disputes turn mainly on questions of law involving the
line marking the boundary between private liberty and public restraint, between private privilege and immunity on the one hand, and public right and
power, on the other, makes this field of controversy peculiarly susceptible to
the expeditious and pacifying ministrations of the declaratory judgment." 14
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was adopted in Tennessee in
1923 147 and has been found useful in reviewing administrative actions. 148
The act provides that "Any person ...whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the ... statute and obtain a declaration
of rights ...thereunder." 149 The courts have not permitted the act to be
used to satisfy curiosity merely or to employ the courts as advisory bodies.
It does not contemplate declarations upon remote contingenciesl50 or where
actual rights are not shown to be involved.'' The Supreme Court of Tennessee says, "[T]o justify a declaration the question must be real, and not
144. Section 6 of the Model Act provides that the validity of any rule may be
determined upon petition for a declaratory judgment.
145. Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciarjy on S. 674,

S. 675, and S.918, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941)
146. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
147. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1923, c. 29.

148.
149.
150..
151.

1579, 1581.
CLXIV (2d ed. 1941).

Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
Tenn. Pub. Acts, 1923, c. 29, § 2.
Nashville Trust Co. v. Dake, 162 Tenn. 356, 36 S.W.2d 905 (1931).
General Securities Co. v. Williams, 161 Tenn. 50, 39 S.W.2d 662 (1930).
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a theoretical question; the person raising it must have a real interest to
raise it; he must be able to secure the proper contradicter, that is'
to say,
sbmeone presently existing who has a true interest to oppose the declaration
sought. . . . Parties are not entitled to an expression of opinion to help
them in 'another transaction." 152 Where these requirements are met, it is
a proper method of testing constitutionality of a statute, 53 but not until
some question arises under the law. Thus, the right to challenge a grant of
rule-making power as an unconstitutional delegation gives no ground for
challenge until that power is exercised, because there is no question 'for the
court to consider, 154 but where a rule is promulgated by an administrative
agency, then parties affected can challenge the rule in a proceeding for
a declaratory judgment. 155
The Declaratory Judgment Act affords protection for an officer who
seeks to avoid liability for his actions when he is uncertain of his powers and
duties. Without such a device, the administrator may be unable to secure
an advance determination of the application or validity of the law under which
he acts.
Some states have enacted legislation specifically permitting declaratory
judgments on administrative statutes and rules. The procedure has been
used in New York to determine the "validity or reasonableness" of certain
statutes or rules under them; 156 Wisconsin permits the. review of reasonableness or lawfulness of rules of its State Board 'of Accountancy; 157
Illinois authorizes appeals from rules of its Departmentof Agriculture,'x s
or the determination of the reasonableness 'r lawfulness of certain rules
of its Industrial Commission. 59
(3)

Declaratory Rulings by Agencies

An analogous proceeding to the declaratory judgment by the' judiciary
6 0
is the use of declaratory rulings by administrative agencies.
Procedures of this type are rare in state legislation' 6 1 but as a practical
152.
153.
154.
155.
(1929) ;

Hodges v. Hamblen, 152 Tenn. 395, 399-400. 277 S.W. 901, 902 (1925).
Goeta v. Smith, 152 Tenn. 451, 278 S.W. 417 (1925).
Mazanec v. Flannery, 176 Tenn. 125, 138 S.W.2d 441 (1940).
Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Railroad Com., 159 Tenn. 43, 15 S.W.2d 751
Tenn. Eastern Eledtric Co. v. Hannah, 157 Tenn. 582, 12 S.W.2d 372 (1928).
156. N. Y. LABOR LAW §§ 111, 112.
157. Wis. STAT. 1939, § 135.
158. In. STAT., C. 5, § 41 (Smith-Hurd, 1941),
159. Id. c. 48, § 137.7.
160. Section 7 of the Model Act grants the agencies the power to issue declaratory rulings but the section is permissive and not mandatory. The federal act, 60 STAT.
239 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1004(d) (Supp. 1946), 'provides that an agency may issue
declaratory orders to "terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty," the power to be
exercised in the agency's "sound discretion."
161. An instance is found in the New York Labor law, Sec. 110, which provides:
"I. Any person in interest 'or his duly authorized agent may petition 'the board of
standards and appeals for review of the validity or reasonableness of any rule or order
made under the provisions of this chapter. . .
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matter in Tennessee, informal and unofficial consultation is not infrequently
used. This presents the difficulty of having its basis too largely in personal
relationship and the further difficulty that such rulings are not binding.
There are many instances in which it may be desirable that agencies
declare rights and duties in advance so that conduct may be guided accordingly. The device has proved especially useful in the federal tax field
where parties wish to know the tax effects of transactions. 162
If a ruling is to be binding, it must be applicable to only those situations in which the elements are certain. One eminent authority suggests
that appropriate situations for the use of the advance judgments include
rulings under the statutes which authorize revocation of licenses or the
imposition of other penalties on persons who use advertising of an unacceptable character. 163 The boards can approve acceptable forms of advertisements and actions prior to liability.
These declaratory rulings have been widely approved. The Attorney
General's Committee said in 1941: "The time is ripe for introducing into
administration itself an instrument similarly devised [to the declaratory
judgment], to achieve similar results in the administrative field. . . . A
major step in that direction would be the establishment of procedures by
162. The power is granted by Int. Rev. Code § 3760.
163. GELLHORN, ADmINISTRATVE LAw-CASES AND COMMENTS 2nd Ed. (1947)
at 805-6. An example is provided by the authorization of tle State Licensing Board for
the Healing Arts to suspend or revoke licenses of dentists, doctors, osteopaths, chiropractors, optometrists, or for the Basic Sciences, for "unethical" advertising. Tenn.
Pub. Acts 1947, c. 9, Secs. 11(6)-(7).
Was it an advance administrative decision perhaps the Tennessee Supreme Court
was seeking in the following case decided nearly twenty years ago? Chapter 64 of
the Public Acts of 1927 provided the Railroad Commission should "have the power,
after notice and hearing, and it shall be its duty so to do, to authorize common carriers
by railroad in Tennessee to entirely discontinue particular intrastate passenger service"
when passenger service is regularly operated at a loss or become unnecessary in the
public interest. The Railroad published notice it would discontinue two trains and the
Commission issued an order to show cause. Denying that the Commission had power to
pass on this discontinuance Judge Chambliss, the late Chief Justice, said: "looking to
the act as a whole, it appears to have been the intention of this act to confer upon
the Commission power, not theretofore possessed, to relieve the railroad of public
service obligations, which under changing conditions had become unduly burdensome;
and that the act was passed for the benefit of the railroads of the State. While there

appears to have been no statutory restriction upon the power of a railroad corporation

to regulate in its discretion its train service, it was doubtless recognized that railroad
corporations-in common with other public service utilities holding franchises conferring condemnation and other privileges-are under obligations to perform all their
functions fairly and fully in the interest of the public, and that an arbitrary and unjustified failure in this regard would subject them to proceedings by mandamus, or
perhaps their charters and franchise rights to forfeiture. . . . We think it may be
fairly deduced that it was the intention of the Legislature . . . to provide . . . a method
by which the reasonableness of . . . modifications found by the railroad managements
to be necessary . . . might be passed upon by a duly authorized semi-judicial
authority. . . . Upon the arising of a debatable issue between Railway Company and
the public served by it, the act empowers the Commission to determine the issue and
thereby relieve the Railroad of the danger of successful attack on the ground of abandonment, non-user, or inadequate discharge of its charter and franchise obligations and
possible impairment of its valuable rights." Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hannah,
160 Tenn. 586, 590-91, 27 S.W.2d 1089, 1090 (1930).
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which an individual who proposes to pursue a course which might involve him
in dispute with an administrative agency, could obtain from that agency, in the
latter's discretion, a binding declaration concerning the consequences of his
proposed action." 164
NOTICE AND HEARING

Although there is much less volume of formal adjudication than of other
portions of administrative procedure, this phase of the process has been
65
the source of more controversy than any other aspect of the subject:'
It occurs in two general categories of cases: first, those where the state is
one of the two parties in the proceeding; and second, cases in which the
state is not a party but supplies an agency to conduct a proceeding, a special
tribunal for determining a controversy between two or more outside interests.
Falling between these categories are various proceedings which fit clearly
neither classification. The methods of hearing and initial decision and the
procedural structure within the agencies, where it is well enough developed
to be called a structure, vary widely.
0

(1) Statutory and Constitutional Requirements of Notice and Hearing
The constitutional requirements of due process as a condition to depriving a person of life, liberty, or property 166 have been an important element in the consideration and development of. the administrative process.
The requirements regarding hearings or procedures may, however, be imposed not only by constitution but also by statute.
Notice customarily implies an opportunity to be heard. The requirement
may, as noted, be imposed as a constitutional or statutory right or it may
be merely desirable. The two bases should not be confused. The due process
requirement is not a precisely defined one, and there is a strong tendency
to consider that which is fair and customary to be due process.
In Tennessee there are a great number of statutorr directions to give
notice and hold hearings. These vary from a simple permission to hold
hearings to assist in fact determinations by the Commissioner of Public
Welfare167 to a typical requirement of fifteen days notice before a license
revocation hearing ordered by the Licensing Board of the Healing Arts. 168
Of the many provisions, the following may convey some idea of the diversity:
The Board of Optometry can give twenty days notice by mail and must state
164. REP.An'Y GEN. Co r.AD.PRoc. 30-31 (1941).
165. The Model act in Section 8, the 1943 Uniform act in Section 10, and the
Federal act in Section 1004, provide in detail for notice and hearing.
166. U. S. CoNsT. AmExD. XIV; TENN. CoNsT. ART. I § 21.
167. TENN. CODF § 4765.12 (Williams, 1934).
168. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 9, § 11.

358

VA,'DERBILT LAW REVIEW

the cause when it seeks to revoke a license. 169 The Board of Chiropractic
Examiners may suspend a license on ten days notice, but a hearing must be
granted in twenty days. 170 The Board of Pharmacy can revoke or suspend
a license by methods or procedures the board itself determines. 171 In other
instances, the hearing may be had, but only if requested. This procedure is
used by the Department of Health in connection with correction of unhealthy
industrial conditions 172 and'by the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation
in certain confiscation cases. 173 When no provision is made, a requirement
of notice may sometimes be implied from the terms of the statute in order
to satisfy due process requirements. 174
The statutory authorization to hold a hearing generally goes no further
than a statement that a hearing is required although in exceptional cases it
may direct a "pulblic " hearing 175 or a "full" hearing 176 or a "fair" hearing. 177
As has been observed, among the few state agencies which have definite
rules and procedures for hearings are the Board of Claims, the Railroad and
Public Utilities Commission, and the Department of Unemployment Security.
The Department of Finance and Taxation, which held twenty or thirty
hearings last year, has adopted no rules of procedure and practice. In the
absence of formal rules, the hearings held by that department are conducted
as though they were in court on oral testimony without a jury. 178
Nor has the Department of Insurance and Baking adopted formal rules.
In cases involving official hearings, the Commissioner gives notice of the
charges to be answered or of the official action about to be taken by the
Department. Information is given as to the time of hearing or the time within
which hearing must be requested. The hearings are conducted in an informal
1
manner. 79
Similarly, none of the licensing boards, such as the Board of Medical
Examiners or the Board of Barber Examiners, has adopted formal rules
for hearings. These various boards hold a total of, about twenty-five hearings
annually. In these hearings the interests of the boards are represented by a
special assistant to the Attorney General. 8 0 The rules of evidence are
169. TENN.

CODE

§ 7039 (Williams, 1934).

170. Id. § 7021.
171. Id. § 7002.12.

172. Id.'§ 5788.17.
173. Id. § 6648.27; Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 3, § 12(c).

174. Large v. Elizabethtown, 203 S.W.2d 907 (Tenn. 1947); Woolard v. Nashville,
108 Tenn. 353, 67 S.W. 801 (1902). But cf. Stockton v. Morris & Pierce, 172 Tenn.
197, 110 S.W.2d 480 (1937).
175. Board of Barber Examiners, TENN. 'CODE § 7131 (Williams 1934).
176. Board of Plumber Examiners, TENNr. CODE § 7172a (Williams 1934).
177. Board of Chiropodists, TENN. CODE § 7182.13 (Williams 1934).
178. S. K. Carson, Letter of Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, July 2, 1947.
179. C. T. Houston, Letter of Deputy Commissioner of Insurance and Banking,

July 8, 1947.

180. The right of boards to hire attorneys is removed by a Miscellaneous Appro-
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followed, and a court reporter is employed where it is anticipated that there
will be ourt review. These boards employ trained investigators to prepare
for action, and the hearings to suspend or revoke licenses are condhucted
by the agencies as authorized by the statutes granting the powers. The chief
responsibility is not the revocation of licenses, in most instances, but the
prevention of unauthorized practice.
The statutes under which the licensing boards fuhction vary widely in
their requirements of notice and similar details, for they have, in most instances, been drafted by the various groups wishing to have them adopted.
Although these hearings have no established procedures it is interesting to
note that they frequently deal with interests classified by the courts as property interests.181
(2) 'Tennessee Agencies with Established Procedural Rules
The statute setting up the Board of Claims is designed to provide a
method of compensating state employees for injuries suffered in the line of
duty18 2 or injuries to private individuals arising from construction or maintenance of state highways, state buildings, or the operation of state vehicles
and equipment. 8 3 It sets up a board composed of the Commissioner of Highways and Public Works, of Finance and Taxation,'the State Treasurer, the
84
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and Reporter.
The rules adopted by the board are brief and explicit. 85 Rule One requires the petition for a claim to be sworn to and supported by affidavits.
The burden of establishing the jurisdiction of the board is placed on the
petitioner by the second rule. The next rule imposes the duty of investigation
upon 'an assistant Attorney General who makes recommendations to the
board in accordance with Rule Four, ihe petitioner being furnished a copy
priations Act. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1941, c. 87, Sec. 7. This act established one special
attorney for the boards. This act has been renewed biennially since 1941.
181. License to practice dentistry is a property right: Prosterman v. Dental
Examiners, 168 Tenn. 16, 73 S.W.2d 687 (1934); License to practice medicine is a
property right: State Board v. Friedman, 150 Tenn. 152, 263 S.W. 75 (1924). Right
to study medicine is a qualified property right: Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171
S.W.2d 822 (1942); Right to sell insurance is a property right: Richardson v. Reese,
165 Tenn. 661, 57 S.W.2d 797 (1933). Law, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, plumbing,
subject to privilege tax; See Thompson v. Dixie Finance Co., 152 Tenn. 306, 278 S.W.

59 (1925). Practice of law is a privilege: Lamb v. Whitaker, 171 Tenn. 485, 106 S.W.2d

105 (1937); Gregory v. Memphis, 157 Tenn. 68, 6 S.W.2d 332 (1928); Lineberger
v. State, 174 Tenn. 538, 129 S.W.2d 198 (1939). Note, 16 TEN-N. L REv. 239, (1941).
Driving automobile is a privilege: Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d ,930
(1940). License to sell beer is no property right: Grubb v. Morristown, 203 S.W.2d 593
(Tenn. 1947); Henderson v. Beer Committee, 176 Tenn. 397, 141 S.W.2d 901 (1940).
Public elective office is a species of property: Rhea County v. White, 163 Tenn. 388,
43 S.W.2d 375 (1931). But see Nashville v. Martin, 156 Tenn. 443, 3 S.W.2d 164 (1928).

182. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 73, § 3.
183. Id. § 5.
184. Id. § 1.

185. RuLES OF BOARD O1ICLAIMS (Tenn. 1945).
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if the recommendation is adverse to the claim. If the decision of the board is
adverse, the claimant may thereafter file exceptions and be heard by
the board. Rules Six, Seven and Eight prescribe notice of the hearing
before the investigator, require that the evidence adduced at the hearing
be reduced to writing and deny the right to re-examine witnesses without permission of the board or the Secretary. The form of depositions
is prescribed, and in Rule Thirteen provision is made for action by a quorum
of the board. Neither the statute nor the rules grant the board or claimant
the right to subpoena witnesses. It is interesting that the board itself hears
evidence only on exceptions to the report. The awards are carried out by
payment by the board. In the proceedings, the Reporter who is an assistant
Attorney General, and the Attorney General are present to supply legal
advice for the conduct of the board, and the claimant may be represented by
counsel. The decision of the board is final, 186 but reconsideration may be had
at any time under Rule Nine if the board agrees unanamously.
1 87
The procedural rules of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission

are considerably more complicated by reason of the scope of the Commission's
activities.' 88 As the last report of the Commission said: "The Railroad and
Public Utilities Commission is charged with the regulation and assessment for
taxation of privately owned utilities. This includes (1) railroad; (2) telephone; (3) telegraph; (4) freight cars; (5) sleeping cars; (6) express;
(7) gas; (8) pipe-line; (9) electric light; (10) power transmission;
(11) street car; (12) electric cooperatives; (13) bus; (14) truck; and
(15) water companies. Street car and electric cooperative companies are
assessed but not regulated." 189
The agency is composed of three commissioners, one from each grand
division of the state. They are elected for six year terms, one each biennium. 190
The basic act 191 is modeled after the Federal Interstate Commerce Act of
19 3
1887.192 The activities of the Commission include assessments for taxation,
fixing rates and charges, preventing discrimination by railroads, 19' motor
186. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 73, Sec. 10.
187. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITIES

CommIssIwN (Tenn. 1942).
188. The regulatory systems for railroads began in Tennessee in 1857 and a Railroad Commission was established in 1883. An interesting history of the development
of this regulatory system by its secretary is found in Tennessee's Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission 16 TENN. L. REv. 974 (1941).
189. REp R.R. AND P.U. CoMM. (1947). A discussion of some aspects of the duties
of the Commission may be found in an article by a member of the Commission. Jourol-

mon, Social Performance of Public Utilities: Effects of Monopoly and Competition,
17 TENN. L. REv. 808 (1942).
190. TENrN. CODE § 5380 (Williams, 1934).
191. McCullom v. Southern Bell, 153 Tenn. 277, 43 S.W.2d 390 (1931).
192. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1940).
193. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 3.
194. TENN. CODE § 5397 (Williams, 1934).
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carriers,
and public utilities, for which latter category the Commission
also fixes standards of service and practice.19 6
In the regulatory field the Commission may grant certificates of public
convenience and necessity, initiate action by orders to show cause. Action may
also be begun by formal petition under Rule Nine, or by informal complaint,
written or oral, under Rule Six. The pleadings need not be verified.
Subpoenas may be issued by the Commission, says the statute, under
regulations it may adopt, 9 7 and the practice is to issue them on approval of
two of the Commissioners. No affidavits are necessary, and 'they may be,
served in person or by mail under the authority of Rule Twelve. The statute
does not specify the scope of the notice, 9 8 but Rule Ten, which requires
the complaint to set forth all matters to be.brought before the Commissioners,
states that the general aim is to formulate issues. Formal objections are not
accepted, but such substantive amendments as a request for more specific
charges will be considered by the Commission.
If a complaint is not satisfied, then an answer is required. A failure
to answer admits the allegations.
On the insufficiency of the complaint, hearing is a matter of right when
it is requested by the party against whom the charges arelodged. Anyone
having an interest, under Rule Twenty-five, may intervene at any time until
the time of hearing, but after the hearing intervention may only be for good
cause. Evidence is taken orally before the Commission or may be by*deposition under Rule Nineteen. Technical rules of evidence are not binding on the
Commission, and hearsay is admissible. The aim of the Commission is to
obtain substantive, reliable evidence. Argument is generally permitted, and'
hearings are conventionally public except in taxing matters. The burden
o'f establishing facts generally lies on the complainant in these adversary
proceedings unless the facts are admitted or unless there is no answer.
Although by the statute a majority of the Commissioners constitute
a quorum, 19 9 where parties consent, hearings are frequently held before individual commissioners.
In accordance with its Rules Twenty-one and Twenty-two, the orders
of the Commission become effective when they are issued and may be en200
forced by mandamus; mandatory injunction, or other summary process.
Rule Twenty-three provides that reconsideration of the orders-may be requested by petition setting forth grounds on which the rehearing is sought.
The agency will not give a declaration of right, although the Com195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 5501.
§ 5450.
§ 5405.
§ 5399.
§ 5382.

200. Id. § 5445.
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missioners individually may express an opinion informally, nor will the
agency give advice on conduct. It will only decide issues presented to it in an
actual case.
That these "quasi"-judicial powers are only a portion of the broad
general powers conferred on the Commission has been long recognized by
the supreme court.201 In such matters as rate-making, the jurisdiction of the
20 3
agency is exclusive 202 and the grant of such power is valid.
The Department of Employment Security has a two-stage appellate
procedure for review of benefits under the Tennessee Employment Security
Act of 1947.204 Claims for benefits are filed in accordance with regulations
made by the Commissioner. Initial determinations are ma!de by a deputy or
by an appeals referee to whom the deputy refers the case. Appeal from the
decision of the deputy goes to the appeal referee, and in turn, appeal from
the appeal referee may be taken to the Board of Review. In each stage
there is a full consideration of the evidence, and in addition to the record,
the appellate'authority can receive new evidence.
The claim is instituted by a claimant, and appeal in the first appeal
stage may be on prepared forms setting forth the requisite details or it. may
be by letter or in other informal petition. 205 The appeal examiner can issue
subpoenas, as can the Board of Review, although the former does not, as a
practical matter, use this power. Notice of hearing is given by mail. The
notice of disallowance from the deputy informs an applicant that appeal can
be had and that it must be in written form but not necessarily in the form
prescribed in the regulation. The appeal may be had in the form of a letter
or written memorandum and need not be verified. The aim is to set the issue
on which the claim is based. The employer is not a party to the proceeding,
and it is not in the nature of an adversary proceeding. The hearing is a
matter of right when requested, and legal counsel is permitted although
rarely used. Generally the appeal examiners have legal backgrounds although
proceedings are very informal in nature, usually in the form of a conference.
The technical rules of evidence are not binding, and questioning and discussion are permitted. The burden of proof is on the claimant, and the record
is kept by voice-recordings on disks. This is transcribed if appeal is taken
to the next stage.
Either the deputy or the claimant may appeal to the Board of Review. 206
The manner of filing appeal and the content of notice are prescribed. The
201. In re Cumberand Power Co., 147 Tenn 504, 249 S.W. 818 (1923).

202. McCullom v. Southern Bell, 163 Tenn. 277, 43 S.W.2d 390 (1931). On construction of the act, see Oman v. Tenn. Sent. Ry., 7 Tenn. App. 141 (1927).
203. Memphis v. Enloe, 141 Tenn. 518, 214 S.W. 71 (1919).
204. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 29, Sec. 6.
205. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF BOARD OF REVIEW or THE DIvISIoN OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

(Tenn.

206. Id. Regulations F-1 and F-2.

1942)

Regulation E.
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Appeal Board may take further evidence, 20 7 may affirm, modify, or set
aside any decision of the appeal tribunal on its own motion.208 The actual
hearing procedure is the same before the Board of Review as before the
appeal referee. The hearing is transcribed and records of evidence, findings
of fact, and decision placed in a permanent file. Decision may be by a
majority of this Board. Copies of all decisions of the appeal tribunal and
the Board of Review are kept on file and are open to public inspection.
The volume of claims disposed by the Department is large. In the
period from July, 1945 through June, 1946, there were 132,004 claims
filed. The appeal authority in this same period disposed of 4472 cases and the
Board of Review of 551. The appeals authority modified the original determination in.969 cases and the Board of Review modified determinations
of the appeal authority 211 times. The number of cases handled demonstrates
that there is good reason to have standardized procedures developed in
this agency.
(3)

Notice and Hearing as Developed by Tennessee Courts

Although only a limited number of agencies have adopted formal rules
of procedure, the courts have, in several instances, discussed various aspects
20 9
of administrative hearings.
Among the essential elements of a hearing, the courts have said, are
210
notice of the charge and a reasonably opportunity to make a defense.
The notice must indicate the time and the-place where the trial body will
211
meet in order that the party may be present in person with his witnesses,
and there must be an inquiry upon the charge preferred. 212 It may not be
necessary to follow an actual trial procedure so long as the individual is
given fair opportunity to present his side, but the evidence should be carefully received and considered although cross-examination is not necessarily
required. The person whose rights are to be affected should be informed of
at least the principal witnesses against him though there is not an absolute
right to confront them,

213

and immunity may be accorded to the statements

214
of parties to and witnesses in such investigations by administrative agencies.
If a hearing is held and a person fails to appear, he is nevertheless

207. Id. Regulation F-3.
208. Id. Regulation F-5.

209, It was in this area of the administrative process (the hearing) that Dean Pound
stressed that an important contribution could be made by the legal profession in the
development of fair procedures. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee of theJudiciary on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918. 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 1580.
210. Richardson v. Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, 670, 57 S.W.2d 797, 800 (1933).
211. Hayden v. Memphis, 100 Tenn. 582, 47 S.W. 182 (1898).
212. Ashcroft v. Goodman, 139 Tenn. 625, 202 S.W. 939 (1918).
213. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 97, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942).
214. Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W.2d 767 (1932).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
bound by the result if he had notice. 215 In certain instances, although there
may be a constitutional requirement of hearing in tax matters, 216 it may be
satisfied if there is hearing at any stage of the proceeding.2 17 In improvement assessments the rule is contrary, and hearing prior to action may be
218
required.
Another aspect of the hearing process which has given rise to some
speculation has been the contempt power of administrative agencies. In some
instances the hearing authorities have the authority to punish directly for
contempt, 219 while other statutes provide that punishment must be through
the intervention of the courts.220 The validity of the authority to punish
directly for contempt has never been passed on by the courts, but doubt has
221
been expressed concerning constitutionality of the grant of such powers.
It seems established under early case law that where a statute creating
a board makes no provision that a majority may act, then no action may be
taken except by the entire board222 although a majority may take action
when the entire board is present.223 Thus where a statute requires that a
majority hear and less than a majority hears, the party has not been ac22 4
corded his right to hearing and the decision iS void.
(4) Rules of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings
While the administrative process in many instances involves a direct
215. Paine v. Fox, 172 Tenn. 290, 112 S.W.2d 1 (1937).
216. Stockton v. Morris & Pierce, 172 Tenn. 197, 110 S.W.2d 480 (1937).
217. Fort v. Dixie Oil Co., 170 Tenn. 183, 93 S.W.2d 1260 (1936).

218. Nashville v. Roberts, 160 Tenn. 612, 26 S.W.2d 1086 (1930).
219. Board of Medical Examiners, TENN. CODE § 6932 (Williams, 1934); Board
of Dental Examiners, Id. § 6969.9; Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, Id. §
5408.
220. TENN. CODE § 5709 (Williams, 1934).
221. Samuels, Power of Adminimstrative Agencies to Compel Testinony in Tennessee,
16 TENN. L. REV. 928, 935-936 (1941). Mr. Samuels' argument proceeds generally
as follows: The courts have the inherent power to publish for contempt: the judicial
power is vested in the Supreme Court and inferior courts which are the only authorities which can exercise the judicial power. Since no one department can exercise the
power properly- belonging to another (TENN. CoxsT. Art. II, §§ 1-2), then the contempt power cannot be granted to administrative agencies. It may be observed that an
identical argument can be made with relation to the subpoena power, the exercise of
which by administrative agencies has been upheld in the state. Rhinehart v. State,
121 Tenn. 420, 117 S.W. 508 (1908). The court has recognized that the granting of
contempt powers in other jurisdictions has been sustained. Rushing v. Tenn. Crime
Comm., 173 Tenn. 308, 318, 117 S.W.2d 4, 8 (1938). The legislature has contempt
power by express constitutional grant. TENN. Co-TsT. Art. II, § 14. If the legislature
grants the power to an administrative body, there seems little reason for not sustaining
it. Perhaps in case of necessity the courts might sustain a quasi-contempt power for
quasi-judicial authorities.
222. See Latture v. Board of Inspectors, 114 Tenn. 516, 520, 86 S.W. 719 (1904).
But see Carroll v. Alsop, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 SAV. 193 (1901) on the scope of applicability of TENN. CODE § 22 (Williams, 1934) which provides in case of joint authority
to three or more officers, then a majority may exercise it unless the contrary is expressly
stipulated.
223. See Cowan v. Murch, 97 Tenn. r90, r98, 37 S.W. 393, 395 (1896).
224. Smoky Mt. Land Co. v. Lattimore, 119 Tenn. 620, 105 S.W. 1028 (1907).
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approach to facts, it is obvious that many hearings involve formal proceedings
similar to judicial hearings, proceedings relating to past events or intangible
considerations. 22 5 It must be borne in mind that administrators have, in most
instances, experience and training for beyond that of the juror and are under
obligation to decide issues in a manner calculated to serve the public interest,
a burden imposed on a juror to a lesser degree.
Common sense and the idea of fairness should be controlling factors in
any proceeding. 226 It has been suggested that the best possible procedure
(that is, a procedure which permits effective government while at the same
time giving fair assurance against individual oppression or mistake) may
vary with different circumstances, so that the quest for it may not be successful if we commence with too rigid an insistance upon a full quota of
preordained ingredients. 22 7 Rather than insisting upon the strict application
of the rules of evidence and upon such devices as cross-examination, fairness
requires knowing what is the case made against one and then an opportunity
to meet it. 228
The marks of a trial-cross-examination, hearing, demeanor evidence,
and similar ingredients-are not particularly suitable for many administrative
proceedings. 22 9 This is true in the matters dealing largely with documents and
technical reports such as may confront the Commissioner of 1rhsurance and
Banking in the reorganization of banks, 230 or in cases of fact finding which
rest on evidence not readily -adaptable to testimonial proof such as exami231
nations for drivers licenses.
In Tennessee some statutes have dealt specifically with the question of
the type of evidence acceptable in administrative proceedings. In cases involving unfair competition, ihe Commissioner of Insurance anq Banking must
grant a hearing, but he is not required to observe "formal rules of pleading
or evidence"; 232 and in the administration of the Tennessee Employment
Security Act the Commissioner is not bound to comply with "common law
or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure." 233 The
courts have recognized that if "material and relevant evidence is adduced" to
support a charge in revocation proceeding, then the re4uirements of hearing
225. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 75 (1941).
226. Section 9 of the Model Act permits administrative agencies to take notice of
general, technical or scientific facts within their specialized knowledge but' requires
parties be notified of the material noticed. The -federal act ensures in § 1004(c) the
right to rebut any facts officially noticed and sets up in § 1006 (c) that evidence must
be "reliable, probative and substantial."
227. GELLHORN, Op. Cit. supra note 163, at 511.
228. Id. at 510-512.
229. Section 9 of the Model Act seems directed at guaranteeing these characteristics of judicial proceedings.
230. TENN. CODE §§ 6055.13-17 (Williams, 1934).

231. Id. § 2715.19.

232. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c.'
208, § 6(c).

233. Id. c. 29, § 6(F).
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have been fulfilled. 234 Though in receiving evidence the agency should "weigh
it, determine whether it comes from a source freighted with prejudice; determine the likelihood, by all surrounding circumstances as to who is right, and
then act upon it as a juror . .," 235 it may be required to consider any
236
specific evidence.
In the course of receiving evidence and hearing cases, the problem arises
of the notice to be taken by an agency of facts which are the results of the
special knowledge in the sphere of activity of the body. The heart of the
problem seems to be that those facts on which a decision rests do or do not
appear in the record, nor do the parties know what these facts are. It is
essential that the facts be distinguished from the utilization of special skills
or expertness in deciding a case. It seems clear that in the course of receiving
evidence and hearing cases, an administrative agency may take notice of those
facts which a court would judicially notice.
For reasons which will appear in the subsequent consideration of the
scope of judicial review, the problem of official notice by administrative
officers has not been the subject of widespread consideration in the state
although in some instances the courts have shown an inclination to defer
to the decisions of expert bodies in the fields of their expertness, 237 and have
expressed a disinclination to assume the duties of detailed supervision of
238
activities delegated to administrative agencies.
(5) Examination of the Evidence
Another phase of the administrative process which has been soundly
pummelled is the delegation of hearing responsibilities. In the federal system
Chief Justice Hughes said a few years ago, in the early stages of the Morgan
240
Case 239 that one who decides must "hear."
In most instances in Tennessee, the hearing officer decides the case.
The Board of Claims provides an exception in which the Reporter hears the
234. Henderson v. Beer Committee, 176 Tenn. 397, 141 S.W.2d 901 (1940).
235. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 97, 109, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942)
236. See Treadwell Realty Co. v. Memphis, 173 Tenn. 168,' 116 S.W.2d 997 (1938),
where the court would not concede that the municipal equalization board could be compelled to receive specific evidence of value.
237. Issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity: Dunlap v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, 178 Tenn. 532, 160 S.W.2d 413 (1942). Approval of dental schools:
Williams v. Board of Dental Examiners, 93 Tenn. 619, 27 S.W. 1019 (1894). Valuation
for tax purposes: W. J. Savage Co. v. Knoxville, 167 Tenn. 642, 72 S.W.2d 1057
(1933). But see Prosterman v. Board of Dental Examiners, 168 Tenn. 16, 73 S.W.2d
687 (1934).
238. Anderson v. Memphis, 167 Tenn. 648, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934).
239. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), 304 U.S. 1 (1937), 307 U.S.
183 (1939), 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
240. Both the Model Act in Section 10 and the 1943 Uniform Act in Section 15
seek to require the deciding officer to consider the evidence. The federal act in Section
1007 has provisions seeking the same result. Each of these acts provides a more or
less detailed procedure for reaching decisions.
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evidence and makes a recommendation to the board which reaches the decision. To this decision exceptions may be filed .and hearing before the
board granted when it is requested. 241 Another exception is the Board of
Review under the Unemployment Compensation Act. This board can affirm,
modify, or set aside any decision of the lower stage on the basis of evidence
previously submitted. 242 A third possible instance is Rule Two of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, which permits the Commission to
avail itself of trial examiners; a power virtually never used, however.2 43
The requirement of "hearing" evidence would seem actually satisfied if
the deciding officer considers.the evidence although the evidence is taken
by another.
A device used in the state to insure consideration of the facts is the
requirment of written findings of fact. The Commissioner of Insurance and
Banking is empowered to investigate and prevent unfair competition. The
act in addition to requiring the written findings of fact, directs the service
2 44
of a copy of the resulting order on persons found guilty of violation.
(6) Conpelling Witnesses
The power of administrative agencies and officers in Tennessee to procure evidence has been the subject of more discussion than the rules of
evidence or the examination of evidence. 245 In Tennessee the power to
subpoena witnesses has been granted to numerous administrative agencies
and officials, both as ancillary to regulatory powers 246 and for the use of
agencies whose powers are purely inquisitorial.2 47 The power is not grahted
in a uniform manner, and in a recent Law Review Article Mr. Samuels has
classified the grants of powers in the following manner: 248 First, those
in which the power to subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance is
granted, but no method of enforcement is provided; second, those in which
power is granted'to issue attachment and to punish non-attendance or refusal
to testify as a contempt; and third, those in which the administrative board
may apply to a court for aid in enforcement of tht right to require attendance.
Though the constitutionality of the grant of subpoena power has been
241. RULES OF BOARD OF CLAIMS (Tenn. 1945), Rule 5.

242. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 29, § 6(E).

243. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITIES COMfMISSION (Tenn. 1942).

244. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 208, § 7. The Model Act in Section 11 would require

every order adverse to a party to a proceeding be in writing and accompanied by written
findings of fact.
245. Samuels, supra note 221.
246. Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, Licensing Boards (with some
exceptions), and the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation.
247. State Crime Commission; Commissioner of Insurance and Banking in investigation of fires; Commissioner of Employment Security to make fact findings.
248. Samuels, supra note 221.
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upheld, some agencies have doubted their power to enforce their subpoenas
where no machinery is provided in the statute for that purpose, 250 and Samuels
suggests that while this may be a sound interpretation of the statutes, enforcement, may be had by invoking the assistance of a chancery court to
251
compel attendance.
The doubt of power to enforce subpoenas directly arises from the
general provision of the Code which provides for the enforcement of
subpoenas issued by "justice or clerk." 252 Thus, says the agency doubting
its power to issue subpoenas, there can be legal enforcement under this
section only of process issued by the justice or clerk. It reasons that when
process is issued by an administrative agency under power granted by the
legislature, this general section is inapplicable since it imposes penalties only
on those who refuse to comply with process issued by these designated
officials. There seems to be no direct local authority to support this strict
interpretation. In a less liberal time than our own, the court has sustained
the applicability of this code section to enforce subpoena powers granted
to the Insurance Commissioner 253 where that official was granted all the
power of a "trial justice" to subpoena witnesses.
A later case2 54 sustained the applicability of this general code section
when the statute creating the Tennessee Crime Commission provided that
the agency might ". . issue a subpeona... [and] the provisions of the general
law of this state in relation to enforcing obedience to a subpoena . . shall
apply." 255

It is submitted that it would do no great violence to hold that the
general code section was applicable to the power of boards and agencies to
issue subpoenas, and it is questionable that the courts would not so hold
were the question submitted to them.
Mr. Samuels also expresses doubt that the contempt power can be validly
granted to administrative agencies, 256 and supports his position with arguments which have been previously considered here. After concluding that
the constitutional separation of powers renders the granting of the power
impossible because it is judicial in nature, he continues: "[A]s a matter of
government policy, it would be highly improper to grdnt such great power
249. Rushing v. Tennessee Crime Commission, 173 Tenn. 308, 117 S.W.2d 308 (1938).
250. State Board of Accountancy held that it lacked the power in In re McIntyre,
trial hearing before State Board of Accountancy at Nashville, December 14, 1940,
discussed by Samuels, supra note 221.
251. Samuels, supra note 221, at 931-932.
252. TENN. CODE § 9785 (Williams, 1934). This was adopted as the first chapter
of the Tenn. Acts of 1794.
253. Rhinehart v. State, 121 Tenn. 420, 117 S.W. 508 (1908).
254. Rushing v. Tennessee Crime Commission, 173 Tenn. 308, 117 S.W.2d 308 (1938).
255. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1937, c. 13.
256. Samuels, supra note 221, at 937.
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over the individual to numerous appointed officials Who are responsible to
the executive and not to the electorate." 257
This latter seems a tenable position, but it seems hardly applicable to
such an agency as the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission whose
members are elected by the entire electorate of the state.
If this is the real reason, however, the wisd6m of granting such power
would seem to be vested in the legislature rather than in the judiciary under
any theory of the "judicial" nature of contempt powers. This may be, the
result of what Goodhart describes as the unfortunate error of thinking that
there is a "special virtue in describing a man as a judge." 258
JUDICIAL REVIEW

One of the most important aspects of administration is the control
which the judiciary exercises over the processes of administration. The
fundamental question lies in the scope of review to b6 allowed. The range
varies from a complete trial de iwvo, 6n the one hand, to an examination
limited to controverted questions of law, on the other.259
The existing provisions for review in Tennessee may be classified as
general or special. The first class includes the general judicial powers of
certiorari, 260 statutory certiorari for review of administrative boards, 261
injunction, 262 mandamus,2 63 declaratory judgment, 2 4 habeas corpus,2 65 private action for damages, 266 or review when action is brought to enforce an
order or impose a penalty.2 67 Special powers are those which relate to the
individual procedures provided for judicial review of the actions of specific
agencies. This latter class is illustrated among others, by the provisions for
257. Ibid.

258. Goodhart, An Apology for Jurisprudence in

INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN
(1947).
259. The Model Act in Section 12 adopts the position of allowing full review of
controverted questions of law but a limited review of questions of fact. This act demonstrates a change in recent years from the attitude that the scope of judicial review
was the sole content of administrative law to a greater emphasis on the procedure
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 299

before administrative bodies.
260. TENN. CODE §§ 8989 et seq. (Williams, 1934); McCanless v. Klein, 182
Tenn. 631, 188 S.W.2d 745 -(1945).
261. TENN. CODE §§ 9008 et seq. (Williams, 1934).
262. State Board of Examiners v. Rodgers, 167 Tenn. 374, 69 S.W.2d 1093 (1934);

Bank of Commerce and Trust Co. v. McLemore, 162 Tenn. 137, 35 S.W.2d 31 (1930);
State Board of Medical Examiners v. Friedman, 150 Tenn. 152, 263 S.W. 75 (1923)
see Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R. v. R.R. and P. U. Comm., 161 Tenn. 592, 598, 32
S.W.2d 1043 (1930).
263. State v. Hobbs, 174 Tenn. 215, 124 S.W.2d 699 (1938); State v. McCanless,
184 Tenn. 83, 195 S.W.2d 619 (1946); McCanless v. State, 181 Tenn. 308,.181 S.W.2d
154 (1944); see State v. Board of Education, 122 Tenn. 161, 163, 121 S.W. 499,
500 (1909).

264. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1923, c. 29; General Securities Co. v. Williams, 161 Tenn.

50, 29 S.W.2d 662 (1930).
265. State v. Head, 182 Tenn. 249, 184 S.W.2d 572 (1945).

266. Cantrell v. Perkins, 177 Tenn. 47, 146 S.W.2d 134 (1940).

267. Bishop v. State, 122 Tenn. 729, 127 S.W. 698 (1909).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
review involved in the enforcement of the unfair competition statute by the
Commissioner of Insurance and Banking, 268 in license revocation by the Game
and Fish Commissioner, 269 and in rulings of the Commissioner of Finance and
Taxation in enforcement of the Tobacco Tax,270 and in the Employment
Security Act of 1947.271

The statement of these remedies leaves for consideration their application: first, which decisions are reviewable, and then, the scope of that review.
The legislature has sought to extend judicial review farther than is
found in many jurisdictions. There is a code section establishing the right of
judges and chancellors to issue writs of certiorari whenever authorized by
law, where an inferior officer or board exercising judicial functions has
exceeded jurisdiction or acted illegally, and when there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy. It provides that certiorari lies on suggestion
of diminution, where no appeal is given, as a substitute for appeal, instead
of audita querala, or instead of writ of error. 272 This is' substantially the
equivalent of common law certiorari.
An addition to this is the special statutory certiorari which originated
in the Code of 1932 for review of actions of boards or commissions. It was
apparently introduced by the official codifiers whose draft of the code was
adopted by the legislature without amendment. 273 This special statutory
certiorari provides that anyone aggrieved by any final order or judgment
of any board or commission, where there is not specific provision for review
otherwise, may file a petition for certiorari in a chancery court and the
hearing shall be on the proof introduced before the board or commission
contained in the transcript and upon such other evidence as either party
may desire to introduce. Discretion is also vested in the court to issue
supersedeas. 274 This is effectively a trial de novo, and in view of thi, issues
such as evidence admissible and the scope of official notice in administrative
hearings are rather academic in nature. It seems substantially to be a refusal
to utilize the talents, the specialized knowledge, and the special abilities of
administrative agencies and officers.
This statutory certiorari was hardly an innovation, however, for there
had been a line of cases, of which Staples v. Bron=, 275 a case involving the
removal of a city attorney by the city council after hearing, is the most frequently cited. Stating that no man can be denied his day in court, the judge
proceeds: "Circuit Courts have original jurisdiction of all cases where
268. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 208 §§ 8 et seq.

269.

TENN.

CODE

§ 5176.66.

270. Id. §§ 1213.7, 1238.
271. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 29, § 6(I).
272. Id. §§ 8989-8992.
273. TENN. CODE Preface, iv (Williams, Shannon, Harsh, 1932).
274. TENN. CODE §§ 9008-9018 (Williams, 1934).
275. 113"Tenn. 639, 85 S.W. 254 (1905).

TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
jurisdiction is not conferred upon some other court, and a general appellate
and revisory jurisdiction over all inferior tribunals, councils, and boards
which may from time to time be created by the legislature and vested with
judicial functions' to review their proceedings in all cases where they have
exceeded their jurisdiction or acted illegally or erroneously. Where no appeal
or writ of error will lie, this jurisdiction may be exercised by writs of
certiorari and supersedeas and the case retried upon the merits." 276 The
there is, then, no doubt that the circuit court has ...
court continues: "...
jurisdiction . .. for correction of their judgments . . . for errors of fact or

law committed by them." 277 The court recognized there were narrow exceptions, such as those involving valuation for taxation, but held that they
were confined to their peculiar facts while its position in the instant case
was well settled.
Though Staples v. Brown had not been overruled, some thirteen years later
the city commissioners of Knoxville removed the chief of police without
a hearing and the court granted certiorari. The supreme court held the scope
of review was limited to the legality of removal on the record.278 Staples v.
Brown was not cited.
In Binford v. Carline,27 9 ten years after this, the court of appeals
approved of the.-Staples case but limited it to its facts, holding that a municipal censorship board, for which no review was provided, was no subject
to judicial review. Judge Heiskell said: "It is true, the statute and the
ordinance do not in express terms make the findings of the censors final,
but

. . .

when an act creating a special tribunal, even one exercising judicial

functions, gives power and authority to settle particular grievances such as
this, and either expressly or by plain implication declares that the judgment
of such special tribunal shall be final, and if it confines itself within its
jurisdiction and does not act illegally the writ of certiorari will not lie to
2 80
review its action upon the merits."
The review of facts on writ of .certiorari has been generally held not
to extend to cases of assessment for taxation because there is conventionally
a statutory provision that the findings of boards "o equalization shall be
28 2
final281 although they are "quasi-judicial" tribunals.
276. Id. at 255; accord, Lewis v. Shelby County, 116 Tenn. 454, 92 S.W. 1098 (1906).

277. Id. at 259.
278. Knoxville v. Conners, 139 Tenn. 45, 201 S.W. 133 (1918); contra: McKee
v. Board of Elections, 173 Tenn. 269, 116 S.W.2d 1033 (1938).
279. 9 Tenn. App. 364 (1928).
280. Id. at 378. This was 4argely a quotation of dicta from Tomlinson v. Board
of Education, 88 Tenn. 1, 12 S.W. 414 (1889), a case involving tax assessment, where
statute provided valuation was final.
281. Tenn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Cooper, 176 Tenn. 229, 140 S.W.2d 411 (1940);
Anderson v. Memphis, 167 Tenn. 648, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934); W. J. Savage Co. v.
Knoxville, 167 Tenn. 642, 72 S.W.2d 1057 (1933) ; Tomlinson v. Board of Equalization,
88 Tenn. 1, 12 S.W. 414 (1889).
282. See Briscoe v. McMillan, 117 Tenn. 115, 100 S.W. 111 (1906).
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The statutory certiorari has been held inapplicable to certain proceedings by the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation even though there is
no provision that the findings shall be final.28 3 Nevertheless, certiorari can be
employed to review assessments when the assessing authority "overleaps the
prescribed limits of the law," 28 4 and, where there is a complete want of
jurisdiction, before the entry of a final degree. 28 5 Ordinarily, the taxpayer
28 6
must first exhaust his administrative remedies.
In other fields, where it is provided that administrative findings of
28
fact shall be final, as in the dismissal of employees by a civil service board, 7
or in revocation of beer permits, 28

8

the courts have accepted such provisions.

The legislature has made frequent use of this device 2 9 and it has also
sought to meet the situation by providing that where the court thinks additional evidence necessary, then it may require the administrator to take
evidence or modify findings if necessary. 29 0 In the instance of the Board
of Claims, its awards are final apparently in questions of law as well as fact. 29'
Where there is no provision that findings of the agency are final, the
court seems free to substitute its judgment. 292
The Railroad and Public Utilities Commission presents difficulties on
this point. The supreme court has said in a proper case that common law
certiorari will lie to afford relief from any arbitrary or oppressive action,203
but the court has denied review to rate-making power as legislative, 294 saying
that the Commission is an administrative body rather than a court. "Many of
the cases dealing with certiorari," says the court, "are cases which arise from
inferior judicial tribunals and in such cases it is entirely proper for the
283. Stockton v. Morris & Pierce, 172 Tenn. 197, 110 S.W.2d 480 (1937); Fort v.
Dixie Oil Co., 170 Tenn. 183, 93 S.W.2d 1260 (1936).
284. State v. Dixie Portland Cement Co., 151 Tenn. 53, 267 S.W. 595 (1925).
285. State v. Hunt, 137 Tenn. 243, 192 S.W. 931 (1916).
,286. Tenn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Cooper, 176 Tenn. 229, 140 S.W.2d 411 (1940);
Mossy Creek Bank v. Jefferson County, 153 Tenn. 332, 284 S.W. 64 (1926); Bank of
Commerce & Trust Co. v. McLemore, 162 Tenn. 137, 35 S.W.2d 31 (1930) (injunction
will lie to prevent illegal assessment).

287. Groomes v. Nashville, 176 Tenn. 391, 141 S.W.2d 899 (1940); Nashville v.
Martin, 156 Tenn. 443, 3 S.W.2d 164 (1928).
288. Putnam County Beer Board v. Speck,' 184 Tenn. 616, 201 S.W.2d 991 (1947).
289. Findings of fact by the Board of Review of the Department of Employment
Security are final: Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 29, § 6 (I). Findings of Commissioner of
Finance and Taxation are final in matters relating to sale of gas: TENN. Cope § 1147.9
(Williams, 1934). Findings of Fish and Game Director are final: TENN. CoDE § 5176.66
(Williams, 1934).
290. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 208, § 8. This statute provides, however, in Section 10,
that despite the findings by the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking to the contrary,
the court can restrain acts if it finds such to be in the interest of the public.
291. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 73, § 10; Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. 201,
54 S.W.2d 953 (1932).
1 292. Prosterman v. Tenn. State Board of Dental Examiners, 168 Tenn. 16, 73 S.W.2d
687 (1934). For an early case contra, see Williams v. State Board of Dental Examiners,

93 Tenn. 619, 27 S.W. 1019 (1894).

299. Williams v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 164 Tenn. 313, 47 S.W.2d 758 (1932).
294. McCullom v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 163 Tenn. 277, 43 S.W.2d 390 (1931).
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courts to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the lower judicial
tribunal, but it does not follow that the court' should substitute its judgment
for the judgment of an administrative body, being another constitutional
branch of government." 295 This result seems highly desirable.
Similarly, in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Commission, there is a presumption of validity, and the burden of showing
action is invalid rests upon the petitioner. 296 An additional instance is provided by the recent attempt of a telephone company to effect a rise in rates
by enjoining a rate suspension order of the Commission. Justice Prewitt
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in granting a supersedeas to the Commission, said: "The injunctive relief of the chancery court should not be
extended to interfere with the statutory provisions governing matters of this
nature." 297 Nor will the allegation of a constitutional question of due process
be effective to carry a case ,under judicial review directly to the supreme
'court unless it appears "from the record that the complaining party has
been denied due process and that the property has been taken from him as
the direct result of such process." 298
The supreme court has said in a frequently cited case 299 that a Public
officer clothed with discretionary or quasi-judicial power cannot be coerced
or restrained in the exercise of that power. He must be permitted to exercise a free and untrammelled judgment. It is his prerogative to construe the
law under which he acts. Later cases have affirmed the principle that practical
construction given an act by an administrative agency operating under it is
entitled to persuasive weight in the judicial construction 3 0 although the
court is not bound by that construction if it is convinced that it is erroneous.3 01
The classification of persons as employees by the Commissioner of
Labor under the Unemployment' Compensation Law has been upheld in
some instances,3 0 2 but the court has not hesitated to reverse the Commissioner
295. S. E. Greyhound v. Dunlap, 178 Tenn. 546, 160 S.W.2d 418 (1942); accord,

Dunlap v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 178 Tenn. 532, 160 S.W.2d 413 (1942). Neither will
the appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in ordinary circumstances.
State v. Bomar, 179 Tenn. 67, 162 S.W.2d 515 (1942); Thompson v. Denman, 164 Tenn.

428, 50 S.W.2d 222 (1932) ; Lewisburg & N. R. Co. v. Dudley, 161 Tenn. 546, 30 S.W.2d
278 (1930); Schrader v. Ky.-Tenn. Light & Power Co., 157 Tenn. 391, 8 S.W.2d 495
(1928). Contra: Schoolfield v. Bean, 26 Tenn. App. 30, 167 S.W.2d 359 (1942).
296. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 161 Tenn. 592, 32 S.W.2d 1043
(1930).
297. Railroad and Public Utilities Commission v. Southern Bell, Unpublished opinion
dated August 4, 1947, filed in Office of the Clerk, Tennessee State Supreme Court August
5, 1947.

298. Tenn. Cent. Ry. v. Pharr, 183 Tenn. 658, 663, 194 S.W.2d 486, 488 (1946). The
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is fixed by TENN. CODE § 10616. (Williams, 1934).
This is considered in Woodruff v. Nashville, 183 Tenn. 483, 192 S.W.2d 1013 (1946).
299. North British & Mercantile Co. v. Craig, 106 Tenn. 621, 62 S.W. 155, 159 (1901).
300. Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637, 122 S.W.2d 423 (1923).
301. Collins v. McCanles , 179 Tenn. 656, 169 S.W.2d (1943).
302. National Optical Stores v. Bryant, 181 Tenn. 266, 181 S.W.2d 139 (1944).
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even in "a very close question" because the act is a taxing statute and doubts
303
must be'resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
The fundamental situation in Tennessee, in view of the foregoing cases
and the statutes, seems to be, that barring some exception either by the
nature of the proceeding or by statute, all administrative determinations
are reviewable de novo in the circuit or chancery courts. As noted, the
number of exceptions is substantial, the larger portion being statutory.
0" 4
Both the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 1
and Commissioner Benjamin 3 5 of New York take the position that the
problem of judicial review cannot be worked out as attempted in this state
by general legislation for all agencies and all types of procedures.
It seems wasteful of talent and time to refuse to avail oneself of the
ability and experience of administrative officers and agencies, virtually the
situation under the provisions for statutory certiorari. It seems strangely
unintelligent to establish administrative agencies and deny their rulings the.
respect and finality necessary to develop an efficient administration. If the
findings of fact by a jury of inexperienced laymen supported by substantial
evidence, are binding on the court, should the findings of fact by personnel,
trained and experienced in their field, be accorded less weight by a judicial
official? It seems unlikely that their superior qualifications should render
administrative personnel less trustworthy.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been the consideration of administrative
procedure as it exists in Tennessee. In most situations the information is
scanty and the cases few. This is due in large measure to the small volume of
business handled by many of the administrative agencies and administrators.
Although the functions of the administrators are essential, it is nonetheless a difficult task to develop detailed rules of procedure and practice
for an agency which hears twenty or thirty cases a year, for agencies which
have no persons who practice regularly before them, but have at best general
practitioners who participate in isolated hearings. To require the adoption of
rules as has been proposed by some theorists, seems an unnecessary burden
in such instances and, as a practicable matter, not likely to be successful.
When the need arises, the convenience to the administrator will ordinarily
bring about provisions for such details.
The publication of general descriptive statements of procedures, as the
federal statute requires, 306 to be filed with the Secretary of State and
303. Wolfe v. Bryant, 181 Tenn. 357, 181 S.W.2d 343, 345 (1945); Guaranty

Mortgage Co. v. Bryant, 179 Tenn. 579, 166 S.W.2d 182 (1943).
304. RFP. Arr'y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 92 (1941).

305. BENjAmm, ADMINsTRATIvE ADJUDICATION 326 (New York, 1942).
306. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 ct seq. (Supp. 1946).

TENNESSEE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
published by him with the rules promulgated by the agencies seems a practicable idea. Such statements would facilitate proceedings before the agencies,
making such material more readily available to the public than if published
individually by the agencies as local statutes now provide.3 0 7 In addition, the
task of preparing and maintaining such statements might well serve to clarify
for the administrator some aspects of his difficulties and make 'available to
other agencies the fruits of his experience.
The problem of judicial review, which has been considered in some detail, seems a fertile field for reform. Without intending to deprecate the ability and conscientiousness of the judiciary of the state, the continued dominance of administrative procedure by this group will effectively prevent the
development of an efficient body of administrative servants to discharge the
ever increasing functions which are being delegated to them.
Cooperation and mutual respect between the judge and the administrator
are the foundation stones upon which any satisfactory system must be constructed. This requires considerable legislation and an awareness on the part
of the judge of the multiform problems which confront administrative agencies. The administrator must recognize his duty to, respect the rights of individuals. This duty is not completely fulfilled if the persons dealt with cannot recognize that justice has been done.
There can be improvement both in administrative practices and in judicial responses. Essentially, the problem is the defense of democratic institutions while recognizing the necessity for government supervision. Our
society is no longer a simple agrarian one and there are forces too great to be
controlled by individual effort. No amount of piety or wit can block this current and no oratory can return us to those simpler days. Our task is to establish a dynamic balance among competing claims, to direct these forces in
the manner whichwill best serve the interests of all the people.
307.
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